Introduction
As Hong Kong transformed itself into a modern manufacturing economy in the first two decades after World War II, its bankers enjoyed a privileged existence. They were free from virtually all official constraints.
Statutory regulation was minimal and largely ignored by bankers and bureaucrats alike. The Government had no monetary policy. There was no central bank to influence bank behaviour, either through formal liquidity requirements or even moral suasion. There were no professional bank regulators, and the officials who dealt with banking issues were mostly uninterested and ill-informed. The statutory exchange controls on foreign currency and bullion markets were not enforced.
Within the industry, the most privileged of all were the local bankers. Officials placed great store on the survival of the 'Chinese native bank' as a traditional family enterprise which ought not to be subject to the full rigours of banking legislation or even to the laws which applied to the business world in general.
Yet, this favoured group failed to make the most of the opportunities created by the modernisation of Hong Kong as it switched from entrepôt to manufacturing for export. Their status declined, and their numbers shrank.
This outcome is something of a surprise because it ran counter to historical trends in China. The tempting explanation for this outcome is that colonial favouritism gave the foreigners their dominant position. 3 Yet, Sir David Li, a prominent Hong Kong banker and vigorous advocate of Chinese banking interests, has declared that 'Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong have never suffered from political or economic repression.' 4 Indeed, throughout the 1950s, the colonial administration was remarkably sympathetic to the difficulties facing the local Chinese banks, as this paper will recount. Furthermore, the Hang Seng Bank demonstrated that colonial rule need not constrain a Chinese bank. By 1964, this 'native' bank had overtaken all its foreign competitors except HSBC, to become the second largest bank in Hong Kong. This paper starts with a discussion of the colonial administration's banking policies and its reluctance to tackle the problems of local Chinese banks during this period. It then assesses the impact on the banking industry of Hong Kong's transition from dependence on the China trade to manufacturing for export to Western markets. There follows a review of three key elements in the traditional Chinese banking model: the revival of the gold market; the creation of a new international money market; and the emergence of a mass residential property market. The paper concludes that the inability of local Chinese banks to dominate the financial landscape despite cultural advantages and favourable government policies can be traced to their failure to modernise their business model. For this, they were not solely to blame. Official tolerance of poor management and outright malpractice reduced their incentives to change in a period when rapid economic growth was creating unprecedented profit opportunities. The analysis relies principally on unpublished archival material.
Fortunes of War
After Japan surrendered in 1945, Hong Kong's local, Chinese-owned banks were among the first businesses to resume normal operations in an economy ravaged by four years of enemy occupation.
Their prospects looked very promising. Before World War II, these banks had flourished, handling mostly Mainland-related business. They had financed trade in a period when China's commerce was constantly disrupted by political anarchy and natural disasters. They had provided access to gold and foreign currencies first when China had multiple domestic currencies before the Guomindong established its authority and then as Japanese aggression provoked an outflow of capital from the Mainland. They had financed real estate on the Mainland as well as locally. These Hong Kong banks had continued to operate 'underground' throughout the Japanese occupation despite the savage penalties for black market activities. They resumed large-scale operation of their normal business of gold and currency dealing and payments for trade consignments less than a month after the end of hostilities in August 1945. 5 Labelled 'Chinese native banks', they took on an almost romantic aura during the early post-war years.
The Far Eastern Economic Review described their role in glowing terms: 6 
The influence of the native banks on the Colony's commerce and finance is enormous. Many well-established and financially potent native banks often finance, the biggest trade propositions as well as industrial and construction projects... A big native bank usually has branches in Canton, and other leading towns in South China, Shanghai and North China cities: many banks extend their activities as far as Malaya, the Philippines, Siam and Indo-China ...
This was to prove the highpoint of both their status and their influence.
When bank licensing was introduced in 1948, Hong Kong had eight China state-owned and 13 foreignowned banks; 33 Chinese-owned commercial banks; and 78 'Chinese native banks'. These categories were soon to be outdated. Yet, the 'native' label was to remain in use for more than a decade although Before World War II, the commercial bank's main business had been handling government loans. 7 After Japan's defeat, the Mainland authorities exerted even tighter control which, together with mounting inflation, undermined their profitability. The 'Chinese native banks' were the only sector of the banking industry that flourished, even in Shanghai, after World War II. 8 Given the dependence of Hong Kong on the Chinese economy before 1949, it was inevitable that the colony's banking structure was viewed in Mainland terms. This tendency was strengthened by the fact that the colonial administration in this period was negotiating the future regulation of its banking industry with the Mainland's central banking authorities, as the next section will explain.
The distinction between Chinese commercial banks and the 'native' variety was made all the more misleading by the efforts made by Mainland 'native' banks to shed this label when they transferred their operations to Hong Kong. They tended to go 'to great trouble and expense in registering themselves as companies, and, on the surface at least, follow Western banking methods', noted a senior official. 9 That trend was evidence that the 'native' classification was going out of favour. In fact, the prestige of the local Chinese banks was to shrink throughout the 1950s. By the end of the decade, their previous In 1964, according to internal government statistics, there were 13 China state-owned banks; 36 foreignowned banks; but only 38 local Chinese banks. In this last group, there were six small, unincorporated businesses which might be regarded as the last survivors of the 'native' banks which had been such a key feature of the industry in the early post-war period. 12 Foreign-owned institutions had become the dominant banking group in the booming, post-war, industrialised economy. Statistical analysis of their decline is handicapped by the Hong Kong Government's refusal to compile economic data in this period. The first comprehensive and reliable banking statistics were collected only in late 1964, when Hong Kong had become a mature manufacturing economy. They show the local Chinese banks firmly in second place and unable to improve their position for the rest of the decade, as Table I indicates.
Blaming Hong Kong
This future fall from grace was not apparent to either the Mainland authorities or the colonial administration when, in 1947, the activities of Hong Kong's Chinese banks provoked a Sino-British crisis. The ruling Guomindong blamed Hong Kong and its unregulated financial markets for the relentless collapse of the national currency and galloping inflation on the Mainland. 13 The 'Chinese native banks' were identified as the principal culprits. In the midst of the financial chaos, the Guomindong were anxious to introduce legislation to reform the entire structure of deposit-taking businesses on the Mainland. 14 They were determined that the colonial administration should take parallel measures to suppress business activities and financial transactions in Hong Kong that were illegal under Mainland legislation. 15 The Guomindong ran a vigorous newspaper campaign to whip up anti-British sentiment on the Mainland and threatened to impose what amounted to an economic blockade on Hong Kong if banking reforms were not introduced.
The British gave way, and agreed to what one member of the Legislative Council described as a 'leasing of our sovereign rights' in allowing the enforcement of Mainland laws within the colony's boundaries. 16 In retrospect, British officials plainly had no need to capitulate to a dying régime. The colonial administration, however, was blind to the fatal weaknesses of the Guomindong, partly because of ignorance of Mainland politics and partly because of close working relations with Guomindong officials. 17 Until early 1948, British diplomats believed that they had little choice but to work for the survival of the Guomindong, and they only started to take seriously the possibility of the Chinese Communist Party's victory in May 1948. 18 By then, it was too late. In secret negotiations, the colonial administration had 13 The best account of the economic crisis faced by the Guomindong and of the Hong Kong relationship is Catherine R. This indiscriminate official approval for firms to operate as banks regardless of their suitability was deliberate policy. Senior officials deleted a requirement in the draft legislation for all licensed banks to be limited companies. The colonial administration claimed that 'rogue' banks always had excellent lawyers and incorporated their businesses. The typical 'native' bank of good repute was, however, unfamiliar with the statutory obligations that incorporation would bring, the Financial Secretary insisted, so that it would be wrong to impose corporate status on them. 27 Behind this decision lay a colonial preconception about Chinese business institutions. Officials looked on Chinese banks as financed not by shareholders but by a network of family and friends and as raising deposits not from the general public but from relatives and business associates. 28 In effect, the colonial administration was seeking to preserve commercial and social practices which had been appropriate to business with the Mainland during periods of political and financial turmoil and when the Chinese economy was barely touched by modernisation. 29 The new law had established a Banking Advisory Committee with strong banking and business representation. Its members pointed out the dangers of issuing licences without further scrutiny to all existing deposit-taking institutions which applied. A. G. Clarke was acting Financial Secretary, and he rejected this advice on the grounds that 'the real purpose of the legislation was not the protection of the public'. But he admitted that a goal of the 1948 Banking Ordinance was 'to stop the setting up of any more mushroom banks'. As a result, he endorsed the committee's proposal that bank licences should be issued only to applicants with a paid-up capital of at least HKD1 million. 30 Thus, virtually any request for a licence was granted in the 1950s provided that the promoters were able to raise the minimum capital required and nothing discreditable about them was known to the Government. Their banking competence was a minor consideration. In fact, the annual licence fee of HKD5,000 per bank would have comfortably covered the costs of professional inspectors. He made no effort to recruit them.
In the meantime, Clarke had given the smaller local Chinese banks informal but almost total exemption from the 1948 Banking Ordinance. 35 Bank after bank ran out of funds, which the officials responsible for banking often discovered only when they inquired why they had not received their statutory copy of the annual accounts for a year or more. The owners would be sent for and persuaded to raise additional capital, which they were mostly happy to promise. Frequently, the injection of new funds merely bought These chaotic conditions did not deter the average Hong Kong Chinese bank, although the bulk of their transactions were of such dubious legality that a conventional commercial bank could not touch them. 39 The victory of the Chinese Communist Party, which became complete in 1949, spelled the end of the armed conflicts, political anarchy and economic disruption for which the local Chinese banking model had been designed. The party took total control of foreign trade and finance, suppressed smuggling and black markets and began to establish a centrally-controlled economy. In the process, Hong Kong's historical role of entrepôt and transhipment centre for the Mainland disappeared.
Although these developments were regarded by contemporaries as an economic disaster and a threat to Hong Kong's survival, a radical shift in the business environment had already been underway. Local industry had started to develop a growth momentum which was to transform Hong Kong into a major exporter of domestic manufactures in the 1950s. The shift from reliance on re-exports to domestic exports, with their much greater value added, was not immediately apparent because the published trade statistics were patchy for much of the decade. This crucial development is illustrated in Table II, which brings together both the confidential and the published data.
Overwhelmingly, factory production was concentrated in the light industrial sector, with the bulk of output sold abroad. Bankers found it difficult to make a distinction between commercial and industrial loans in an economy where the manufactured product, almost always, had been pre-sold to an overseas buyer. 40 Few manufacturers operated on their own account until late in the last century. They started 36 Instances of the problems referred to in this paragraph can be found in HKRS41-1-3012 'Yau Tak Bank. production only after receiving a firm order from a foreign buyer (or a local import-export firm), which allowed financing of the factory's activities through letters of credit and other short-term facilities. The provision of trade finance and short-term capital secured against export orders largely via letters of credit, with additional income generated by the associated import and export transactions in foreign currency, left little room for speculation, and the management of credit risk was straightforward. Turnover, both of orders and loans, was rapid. Bank lending could thus support a much higher level of production in manufacturing than in other sectors, property and construction in particular. This was banking of the most traditional and conservative kind. Local Chinese banks ought, therefore, to have had little difficulty in competing for the new manufacturing
customers. Yet, they were not enthusiastic about offering trade-based facilities to the local industrialist.
They generally sought to compete with their foreign rivals by providing banking services which were of maximum convenience to the Chinese community. The new manufacturers, however, were not easy for them to serve. They exported to countries where modern commercial banking prevailed and in which transactions had to comply with increasingly strict import and export procedures and to be fully documented. These were orderly markets, very different from the Mainland conditions to which the local Chinese banks were accustomed. Not surprisingly, the average local Chinese bank retained a preference for the patterns of the past: financing gold and currency deals and lending to related parties for property projects in particular, even though they were increasingly exposed to modern commercial banking. It is a reflection of the Government's ignorance of the way in which the banks operated that, in the early 1960s, officials denied that a bank's loans could exceed its deposits, and thus they were unaware of the 'liquidity loophole'. 49 When the first comprehensive banking statistics were collected by the newlyestablished Banking Commission in 1964, the figures showed how significant was the influence of the liquidity loophole on the lending behaviour of the foreign banks. According to these unpublished data, the ratio of loans to deposits for the different banking groups at the end of 1964 was:
• Out of the foreign banks, 11 had loan books which exceeded the total value of their deposits. There were only six local Chinese banks with such high loan/deposit ratios. 50 Later, when the Banking Commissioner undertook its first detailed analysis of the lending patterns of different groups of banks at the end of the 1960s, when Hong Kong was now a mature manufacturing centre, the difference in the lending patterns of the three groups of banks was very plain. As Table III shows, the foreign banks had built up a dominant position in the finance of industry. Clear, too, was the fidelity of the local Chinese banks to their traditional business model, with its preference for personal lending and the property sector.
It was also striking how conservative were China state-owned banks, both in terms of their loan/deposit ratio in 1964 and in their lending patterns shown in Table III . Their role was to serve the national interests of China in its international financial and commercial activities. Their involvement in the 'capitalist' economy of Hong Kong was subordinate to that priority and, hence, their lending to industry, property and personal customers was limited. But a subsequent section will show how they contributed to the Hong Kong's development as an international financial centre.
The Lure of Gold
The failure to exploit the opportunities offered by the boom in manufacturing for export was an error from which the local Chinese banks were not to recover in the twentieth century. Yet, it was to take time for the serious restrictions imposed by the traditional formula of gold, currency and real estate to surface. As Table IV indicates, the gold market revived dramatically in the mid-1950s. It was a highly profitable business which helped to offset the declining fortunes of the rest of the re-export sector. Comparison of Table II with Table IV In theory, the average local Chinese bank was well placed to take advantage of the free currency market.
Many foreign banks were categorised as 'authorised' institutions and thereby supposed to conform strictly to Sterling Area regulations. But, on the whole, foreign banks were able to escape from the constraints of exchange controls. United States banks in Hong Kong had ample access to American dollars, while continental European banks were able to flout Sterling Area requirements in their currency transactions. 58 For the sake of efficiency, the foreign bank sector found it convenient to maintain relations with individual local Chinese banks because, thanks to the free market, they offered faster and more convenient services to customers outside the Sterling Area. 59 However, post-war recovery in Western Europe and Japan meant that the international scarcity of dollars was easing in this decade. During the early 1960s, the commercial importance of the free market for local Chinese banks waned still further. The attractions of sterling increased, thanks to high rates of interest and the general convenience of holding reserves in sterling, to which the Hong Kong dollar was then tied by a fixed exchange rate. The Hang Seng Bank, for example, stuck to its 'unauthorised' status after being taken over by HSBC in 1965. Yet, despite this local Chinese bank's freedom from exchange controls, it maintained substantial sterling holdings in London which were left uncovered, despite continuous speculation that the pound would devalue. 60 Other local Chinese banks had started to take a different view of 'authorised' status in the late 1950s.
They saw it as the way to present themselves as 'being completely trustworthy ... an approved bank in the eyes of the world'. 61 This added prestige was more than enough to offset any inconvenience of being subject to Sterling Area regulations, all the more so because officials made little effort to ensure that applicants would comply with their new obligations. 62 Applications for 'authorised' status continued in the 1960s, by which time the distinction between 'authorised' and other banks in terms of banking practice had almost disappeared, regardless of the strict letter of the law. 63 The incentive to change status was now plainly the desire of former 'native' banks for greater market credibility through promotion to the ranks of the modern, Western-style financial institutions and thus leaving behind the roles of money-changer and gold dealer. 64
An International Money Market
This concern with respectability emerged as a new wholesale banking operation was developing.
Observers have tended to overlook Hong Kong's role as an international financial centre before the end of the 1960s and the extension of the euro-currency market to Asia. 65 The funds to purchase this sterling were generated by the Mainland's exports to Hong Kong, the profits States' blockade and the Sterling Area itself had come to an end.
During the Maoist era, in short, the worse the political and economic climate that confronted the Chinese Government, the greater Beijing's reliance on Hong Kong's financial institutions. There was thus a remarkably close parallel between the Hong Kong banks' relationship with the Mainland in this period and their historical role in the Mainland economy discussed in the first part of this paper.
The Perils of Property
Impressive growth by some local Chinese banks in the 1950s seemed to validate their attachment to the traditional business model with its preference for gold, currency and property. This success, nevertheless, contained the seeds of its own destruction. For too many of these banks, the speculative features of the model were masked by the 'real' assets which were involved. The risk of self-destruction built into the business model emerged dramatically in the early 1960s because of developments in the real-estate sector. In the meantime, however, the attachment to an outdated and increasingly risky business strategy continued, leading even the Hang Seng Bank, the biggest and best of them, to the edge of ruin.
Property owners faced considerable constraints on their freedom to redevelop urban sites in the early post-war period. In 1953, the law was amended to permit owners to clear occupants from damaged or dangerous premises and to rebuild them, which led to a sharp rise in the level of activity in the property market. Until 1956, however, there was a ban on the construction of buildings of more than five storeys (or 80 feet) in height. 71 The law was then changed, which made it possible for property developers to switch to multi-storey residential projects, with individual dwelling units pre-sold to the public. The business seemed conservative enough. An official report described how in 1958 speculation was not a concern and the market had focused on cheaper units. The lack of distinction between personal and corporate interests meant, of course, that loans for property projects were not arm's length, and the public's deposits were treated like equity capital. These dubious practices tended to aggravate the historical dangers of the property cycle itself, which even before
World War II had led to calls for banking regulation. 73 The inability of individual bankers to resist the heady profits offered by property lending became a major threat to banking stability in the late 1950s.
Inevitably, the developers' dependence on their bankers increased, and the commitments of local Chinese banks to real estate grew to a disturbing level, as the Government publicly acknowledged. 74 Officials were deterred from intervening, however, because they felt very dependent on the private sector's contribution to tackling the overcrowding and squalor in which a high proportion of the population was living. 75 So, the bankers were left to their own devices until such times as a new banking law was introduced.
The threat to banking stability had been increased by another risk: fraud or mismanagement which could halt a project before completion. Increasingly, the new, multi-storey developments were being sold on instalment terms prior to completion. This practice appeared to reduce a bank's exposure and to allow an increased turnover of its loans, which could lull its management into believing it safe for the bank to increase the leveraging of its property portfolio. The dangers of such complacency were illustrated in 1960. A project pre-selling 299 units ran out of funds before completion. In this case, a solicitor had diverted part of the purchasers' payments to other projects. The Government moved swiftly to introduce arrangements to protect instalment payments from frauds of this type. 76 This lesson, unfortunately, was not taken to heart by local Chinese banks as a group, and so were laid the foundations of the 1965 bank crisis. 73 The impact of reckless property lending had been a major argument in favour of legislation to regulate banks in 1938. (9) Paradoxically, it was to be government intervention in the market that first intensified the property boom and then led to a crash which was followed by the worst bank runs in Hong Kong's history. The announcement in 1962 that building densities would be reduced from 1966 caused a rush to start new projects. These were planned on the basis of completion schedules that proved increasingly difficult to achieve. 77 The situation was aggravated by further controls introduced in 1964 to limit the hazards created by demolition and redevelopment of existing buildings. These regulations slowed down the rate at which construction could proceed and increased the risk of breach of building covenants. 78 The extreme volatility of the property sector in response to changes in legislation, government policy and political shocks is illustrated by Table VI 
The Costs of Complacency
The Government did not foresee the looming instability which would feed into the banking system from the property market, although officials had become aware of the vulnerability of the local to involve a liquidity problem, malpractice was also involved because the managing director had 'borrowed' HKD8 million from the bank. Liu Chong Hing was deemed too large to be allowed to fail, and its rescue was organised in 1961. 83 The managing director's death prevented criminal proceedings against him. Leading bankers grew alarmed, and HSBC led a campaign for a new and tougher law. After considerable delay, the 1964 Banking Ordinance was passed, imposing minimum liquidity requirements and restricting the freedom to lend to related parties. 84 The law had been introduced to control the sort of risks created by the property sector and its banking links. But it was too late for the Government to fend off disaster. 
The End of Benign Neglect
The 1965 crisis provided the excuse to introduce new legislation which strengthened considerably the Banking Commission's powers of oversight and inspection, raised capital requirements, tightened the statutory liquidity ratios and restricted new branches. 87 It also led to a new approach to banks in distress.
No licensed bank would be allowed to collapse at its depositors' expense until 1991 and the failure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Underlying this new policy was the 1964 Banking
Ordinance which had created the structure which would allow licensed banks and their lending behaviour to be monitored.
A rejection of the benign neglect of the 1950s had become unavoidable because of the fatal weaknesses in the traditional banking model. Licences had been granted to anyone who could put up the minimum capital. How the bank was managed was not seen as a matter for the Government. As a result, officials looked upon preservation of the minimum level of capital as the measure of a bank's soundness. They attached little importance to liquidity and diversification of lending even though the 1950s witnessed major failures of banks that had concentrated their lending in a local wolfram mine, for example, and in fishing vessels. 88 The official files show that the only limit to official indifference was a serious threat of public discontent.
The rise and fall of the property market in the 1960s demonstrated that banking management and liquidity were the critical factors for banking stability, rather than the initial capital. More important still, the scale of banking had been transformed. Local Chinese banks had realised that they could not rely on family and friends for the funds to function as modern banks. They needed to mobilise deposits from the general public. Once a bank's depositors numbered thousands, the risk of riots in response to a bank's failure could no longer be ignored. 
